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Abstract
The paper builds a tractable model of a patent pool, an agreement among patent owners
to license a set of their patents to one another or to third parties. It Þrst provides a necessary
and sufficient condition for a patent pool to enhance welfare. It shows that requiring pool
members to be able to independently license patents matters if and only if the pool is
otherwise welfare reducing, a property that allows the antitrust authorities to use this
requirement to screen out unattractive pools.
The paper then undertakes a number of extensions: cases where patents differ in impor-
tance, where asymmetric blocking patterns exist, and where licensors are also licencees. We
also undertake some initial explorations of the impact of pools on innovation. We conclude
by showing that the analysis has broader applicability than pools, as it is also relevant to
a number of co-marketing arrangements.
Keywords: Intellectual property, open and closed pools, essential patents, independent
licensing.
JEL numbers: K11, L41, M2.
1 Introduction
A patent pool is an agreement among patent owners to license a set of their patents to one
another or to third parties. Patent pools have played an important role in industry since the
1856 sewing machine pool, although their number and importance considerably subsided in a
hostile antitrust environment after World War II. Patent pools have been making a comeback in
the last few years, and many believe that pools are bound to be as important or more important
in the new economy as they were in traditional sectors. Innovations in computer hardware,
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software, and biotechnology often build on a number of other innovations owned by a diverse set
of owners and as a result patent thicket" problems - overlapping patent claims that preclude
the adoption of new technologies - can be severe.1
There is now widespread agreement among policymakers and economists that patent pools
may beneÞt both intellectual property owners and consumers, provided that the pools include
patents that are complementary or blocking. It is perhaps puzzling that so few pools have been
formed in the recent past despite the favorable treatment the US Department of Justice (DOJ)
and the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have given to pools. At least in part, the reluctance
to form pools may be due to the ambiguities surrounding the manner in which proposed pools
will be evaluated.
This paper analyzes the strategic incentives to form a pool in the presence of innovations
that either compete with or are complementary to the patents in the pool. A second focus
of our analysis is the process through which competition authorities examine patent pools. A
recent doctrine is that only essential patents be included in pools. In a number of cases, an
independent expert has been assigned the role of ensuring that only essential inventions are added
to the pool and removing patents that are no longer essential in the future. In the context of a
pool deÞning a DVD-ROM and video standard, Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein deÞned
essentiality in the following way:2
Essential patents, by deÞnition, have no substitutes; one needs licenses to each of
them in order to comply with the standard.
One may wonder whether such requirements are too strict or too lenient.
Another feature of interest in the recent pools approved by American antitrust authorities
is that patent owners retain a right to license their invention separately from the pool. More
generally, 44% of the 63 pools included in the sample in Lerner et al. (2002) allow pool members to
1See Carlson (1999) and Gilbert (2002) for excellent historical perspectives on patent pools.
2Letter of Joel I. Klein to R. Carey Ramos, Esq., June 10, 1999,
http://www.usdoj.gov:80/atr/public/busreview/2485.wpd.
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offer independent licenses outside the pool. When is the independent-licensing provision beneÞcial
to the members of the pool? Is it a (presumably cheap) way of accommodating the concerns of
antitrust authorities?
Shapiro (2001) uses Cournot (1838)s analysis to point out that patent pools raise welfare
when patents are perfect complements and harm welfare when they are perfect substitutes.
While this is a useful Þrst step in the antitrust analysis of patent pools, patents are rarely
perfect complements or perfect substitutes. Indeed, antitrust authorities often wonder whether
they are complements or substitutes. Furthermore, patents that are currently complements may
in the future become substitutes as they enable new products that compete on the downstream
markets. Last, many interesting policy issues do not arise in a world of perfect complementarity.
For example, with perfect complements, all patents would necessarily be equally important;
the provision of independent licenses by patent owners would be meaningless; and a pool would
always reduce price, encourage innovation, and reduce the intensity of patent holders foreclosure
of downstream product market rivals.
The goal of this paper is to develop a richer model, in which we can analyze existing institu-
tional features and antitrust policy. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds a model
that allows the full range between the two polar cases of perfectly substitutable and perfectly
complementary patents, and yet is tractable. It notes that except in the two polar cases, whether
patents are substitutes or complements depends on the level of licensing fees. Section 3 provides
a necessary and sufficient condition for pools to be pro-competitive in the absence of independent
licenses. Section 4 shows that independent licenses can be used by competition authorities as a
screening device. Section 5 considers asymmetric patents. Section 6 generalizes the analysis to
the case in which licensors are also licensees. Section 7 analyzes the impact of the prospect of
pool formation on the incentive to innovate. And Section 8 discusses more general co-marketing
agreements for which the analysis in this paper should be relevant.
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2 Model
Intellectual property rights.
There are n owners, each of whom has a patent on one innovation. For the moment, we
assume that (a) patents are symmetrical in importance, (b) patent owners are not downstream
users and therefore not potential licensees, and (c) the formation of the pool has no effect on
future innovation in the industry. We will relax these assumptions in sections 5 through 7. We
further assume that all parties are symmetrically informed.3
Demand for licenses.
Licensing involves no transaction or other costs. There is a continuum of potential users
or licensees. Users are heterogeneous and are indexed by parameter θ ∈ £θ, θ¤ . User θs gross
surplus from using m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n, innovations is
θ + V (m) .
The non user-idiosyncratic component V (·) is strictly increasing, unless otherwise speciÞed
(we will occasionally consider limit cases in which V (m) = V (m − 1) for some m). Thus, it
is possible to employ the technology with a subset of patents, but the use of the technology is
optimized by combining as many patents as possible.
The idiosyncratic parameter θ reßects the heterogeneity in a) the Þxed cost for the licensee to
adopt the overall technology on which the patents are based, b) her opportunity cost of choosing
this technology over an alternative one and c) the beneÞts she derives from the technology (the
technology may enable the user to produce, to reap network externalities, or else to boost its
research capability in the area). Letting F denote the cumulative distribution of θ, the demand
for the bundle of the n innovations licensed at price P is
D (P − V (n)) = Pr (θ + V (n) ≥ P ) = 1− F (P − V (n)).
3Under asymmetric information, results might differ. For example, pools are less likely to form when the
owners of intellectual property have different information about such topics as the value or the effective duration of
individual innovations. Bargaining inefficiencies are then bound to arise. For instance, such information problems
might lead the holders of patents that are substitutes to not realize that there are potential gains from trade and
to fail to form an anti-competitive pool. In addition, when substantial decisions have to be made after the pool
is formed, it may be difficult to design a proper governance structure: i.e., to align the interest of pool members.
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We assume that the hazard rate fÁ [1− F ] is strictly increasing (which is satisÞed by almost
all familiar distributions). Because fÁ [1− F ] = −D0/D, this assumption ensures the strict
quasi-concavity of the pools and other maximization programs.4 We will further assume for
conciseness that the support [θ, θ] is sufficiently wide so as to guarantee interior solutions. In
particular, θ + V (n) > 0 (otherwise, the technology would never be used).
While we must consider the details of these assumptions in more detail, it is worth pausing
to consider the pools maximization problem here. Let P ∗ denote the optimal price charged by
the pool when patent owners cannot issue independent licenses:
P ∗ = arg max
P
{PD (P − V (n))} . (1)
There are several motivations for focusing on separable user preferences:
 First, this structure simpliÞes the analysis and exposition, as it implies that all licensees
select the same basket of licenses in the absence of a pool.
 Second, and relatedly, the additive structure implies that it is optimal for a pool to offer
solely a package license.5 In other words, a pool cannot screen the users type by offering,
for example, a choice between the package license and licenses for subsets of patents.6 A
preference structure in which the users type affects the marginal willingness to pay for
patents would induce the pool to offer a menu of options. While such menus of options are
interesting in their own right, they would add a distracting complication for the purposes
of this paper.
4Consider for example the pools maximization problem ((1) below). At the optimal price PD0 +D = 0, and
so the second derivative of the proÞt function PD00+2D0 has the same sign at that point as DD00− 2 (D0)2. The
monotone hazard rate condition implies that DD00 < (D0)2, and so the proÞt function is quasi-concave.
5Which they usually do: only 12% of the pools in the Lerner et al. (2002) sample offered menus of patents. To
be sure, the absence of a menu may have other motivations than that given here. The MPEG pool, for instance,
considered offering menus, and ultimately rejected it. One major concern was the bargaining complexities that
would be introduced, given the uncertainty about the valuation of many of the patents and the private information
that many of the parties had about particular technologies.
6It can further be shown that the pool does not beneÞt from using stochastic schemes, in which the number
of patents received and the price paid by the licensee are random functions of the licensees announcement.
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 Third, this structure will enable us to offer a clean description of the two constraints faced
by an independent licensor in the absence of a pool. When contemplating a licensing fee
increase, the independent licensor will worry either about her patent being excluded from
the basket of patents selected by licensees, or, when retained in this basket, about the
reduction in the overall demand for the basket. That is, the independent licensor may
be constrained by either of two margins: the competition margin and the demand margin.
Thus, the demand margin is said to bind in equilibrium for patent i if licensor i could
individually raise her license price without triggering an exclusion of her individual license
from the basket of patents selected by the licensees; otherwise it is the competition margin
that binds for patent i.
Substitutes and complements.
Let
w (m) ≡ V (m)− V (m− 1) > 0
denote the users willingness to pay for an mth patent when already having access to m − 1
patents.7 Because V is strictly increasing, this marginal willingness to pay is strictly positive.
Definition 1: The surplus function is concave if w is decreasing in m and convex if w is
increasing in m.
Unless otherwise speciÞed, we will not impose speciÞc restrictions such as convexity or con-
cavity on the surplus function. First, the surplus function may be neither concave nor convex.8
Second, while there is some connection between concavity and substitutability, and between
convexity and complementarity, the degree of complementarity cannot be deÞned solely on this
basis, as we will see.
Definition 2: Patents are perfect substitutes if V (n) = V (n− 1), and so licensors compete à la
Bertrand in the absence of pool, and perfect complements (Cournot-Shapiro case) if θ+V (n−1) ≤
7For example, for V (m) = (m/n)α with α < 1, w(n) = 1− ((n− 1)/n)α. It converges to 0 as α converges to
0.
8For example, implementing the technology may require a minimum numberm0 of patents, but patents become
competitors beyond that level (w(m) small for m ≥ m0).
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0, so no licensee beneÞts from (even free) access to less than the full set of patents.
The traditional deÞnition of substitutability (respectively, complementarity) is that two goods
are substitutes (complements) if increasing the price of one raises (lowers) the demand for the
other. Except in the non-generic cases of perfect complements or substitutes, however, patents
are complements at low prices and substitutes at high prices: When V (·) is strictly increasing
and the prices are low, users strictly prefer to use all patents conditionally on adopting the
technology; thus a decrease in the price of one patent attracts new users to the technology and
boosts the demand for the others. By contrast, with high prices, users may want to use a subset
of patents and thus the patents compete with each other.9
Remark (users market power): In some settings, patent users are corporations with non-negligible
market power. While, in the presentation of the model, users were described as end-users (or per-
fectly competitive Þrms), our analysis does not hinge on this interpretation. All that is needed
throughout the paper is that downstream demand depends on the net price P − V (n) (or the
equivalent for a subset of patents).10 In the presence of downstream market power, our welfare
results are unchanged as long as a decrease in the price P of the package of patents raises total
welfare (equal to licensors and downstream Þrms proÞt, plus the welfare of Þnal users served
9For example, with two patents, if p1 = p2 = p < V (2)−V (1), the two patents are complements (the demand
for each is equal to 1−F (p1 + p2 − V (2)); if p1 and p2 both exceed V (2)−V (1) (but are smaller than θ+V (1)),
then the two patents are perfect substitutes in that licensees all select the cheapest patent if they adopt the
technology.
The general assertion for an arbitrary number of patents corresponds to Proposition 1.
10Let us sketch how a downstream imperfectly competitive market can be subsumed in our framework. Suppose
that there are K potential downstream competitors. In the case of a pool without independent licensing (in the
no-pool and pool-with-independent-licensing cases, stage a) is modiÞed appropriately), the timing goes as follows:
a) the pool sets price P ; b) the K Þrms each select whether to buy the technology at price P ; c) Þrms wage
competition in the downstream market. One can think of Þrms that do not buy the technology as staying out, or
more generally as being weak competitors. Let x denote the equilibrium probability that a given Þrm buys the
technology, and πk+ θ+V (n)−P as Þrms net beneÞt from buying the technology when (k− 1) other Þrms buy
it. [θ + V (n)] can be thought of as (minus) the Þxed cost (or reduction therefore) associated with the adoption
of the technology, and the variable proÞt πk is decreasing in k. As above, θ is distributed independently across
users according to some distribution F . Let π (x) ≡
K−1P
k=0
³
K − 1
k
´
xk (1− x)K−1−k πk+1, with π0 < 0. The stage
b) (technology adoption) equilibrium is unique and given by
x = 1− F (P − V (n)− π (x)) .
Hence, the pools demand (Kx) depends only on P − V (n); and similarly when licensors license their patents
individually.
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by these downstream Þrms), a most reasonable assumption. This generality comes from the fact
that we look at whether a pool, with or without licensing, raises or lowers price, and so our
analysis does not depend on the exact expression of welfare.
3 When is a pool pro-competitive?
This section proceeds as follows: Þrst, it demonstrates the existence of and characterizes the
(unique) symmetric equilibrium (3.1). Focusing on this symmetric equilibrium, it then studies
whether the formation of a pool is pro-competitive (3.2). Finally, it investigates the existence of
asymmetric equilibria (3.3).
In the absence of a pool, the timing is as follows: a) The licensors choose their individual
prices pi simultaneously and non-cooperatively. Suppose, thus, that the n licensors charge prices
P ≡ (p1 · · · , pn), where without loss of generality, p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. b) Users select how many
and which licenses to buy. A users licensing decision can be decomposed into two steps. First,
the user solves
V (P) = max
m≤n
{V (m)− (p1 + · · ·+ pm)} .
We will assume that the users purchase the maximum number of patents in the optimal set
whenever this program has multiple solutions.11 Second, the user adopts the technology if and
only if θ + V (P) ≥ 0.
We analyze the pure-strategy equilibria of this game. Note that, if there are licenses with
positive sales in equilibrium, then all licensors have positive sales.12
11This assumption is required to guarantee the existence of equilibrium when there is no pool or when the
pool members can license independently. If the users did not purchase the maximum number of patents when
indifferent, an openness problem would arise in which, when the competition margin binds, each licensee would
want to charge almost as much as what keeps her patent in the basket selected by the users, but would not
Þnd it optimal to make the consumer indifferent.
12Letm (P) denote the number of licenses with positive sales for price conÞguration P (with p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn).
For equilibrium prices, m (P) = n. If this were not the case, licensor n (the highest price licensor by assumption)
would make no proÞt and so would gain by charging any price exceeding 0 but smaller than w (m (P) + 1), as
such a price would induce users to license her technology.
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3.1 Existence
We Þrst demonstrate the existence of a symmetric equilibrium.
a) Demand margin binds.
Recall that the demand margin binds when an individual licensor can raise her price slightly
without triggering an eviction of her license from the basket of patents selected by users. Then,
individual licensors choose their license price pi = bp by solving:
bp = arg max
pi
{piD (pi + (n− 1) bp− V (n))} . (2)
And so: bpD0 (nbp− V (n)) + D (nbp− V (n)) = 0. The monotone hazard rate condition implies
that there is a unique such bp.
Instead of setting price pi for her patent, and given that in equilibrium the (n − 1) other
licensors charge bp each, licensor i can be viewed as setting total price P for the basket of the n
patents and keeping pi = P − (n−1)bp for herself. Thus, rewriting (2), note that bP = nbp satisÞes
bP = arg max
P
{[P − (n− 1) bp]D (P − V (n))} , (3)
and so, by revealed preference,13 bP ≥ P ∗. (4)
Under noncoordinated pricing, each licensor does not internalize the increase in the other licen-
sors proÞts when demand for the package is increased by a reduction in her price. This result
generalizes the Cournot-Shapiro argument: If the demand margin binds in the absence of pool,
then a pool reduces the price paid by users.
13Note that (1) and (3) are part of a broader family of maximization programs:
max
P
{π (P ,c) ≡ (P − c)D (P − V (n))}, where c = c∗ = 0 in program (1) and c = bc = (n− 1) bp in program (3).
Because ∂2π/∂P∂c > 0, bP ≥ P ∗ by revealed preference: If Pi is optimal for ci and Pj is optimal for cj , then
π (Pi,ci) ≥ π (Pj ,ci). Applying these two inequalities for (P ∗, c∗) and
³ bP , bc´ and adding them up yieldsZ bc
c∗
Z bP
P∗
¡
∂2π/∂P∂c
¢
dPdc ≥ 0,
and so bP ≥ P ∗ as bc > c∗.
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b) Competition margin binds.
Let us now consider a symmetric equilibrium in which the competition margin binds. In
such an equilibrium, each licensor would like to increase her price at least slightly (that is,
piD (pi + P−i − V (n)) is locally increasing in pi where P−i ≡ Σj 6=ipj), but cannot do so because
her patent would then be evicted from the basket of patents selected by the users. Accordingly,
let p = z(n) denote the unique price p satisfying:
V (n)− np = max
m<n
{V (m)−mp} . (5)
In a symmetric price conÞguration with price z(n), licensors are constrained by the competition
margin as long as piD (pi + (n− 1) z(n)− V (n)) is locally increasing in pi at pi = z(n). Note
that z(n) is independent of the distribution of θ. In the concave case
z(n) = w(n).
More generally
z(n) ≤ w(n),
(since users can select n− 1 patents), possibly with strict inequality.14 As we will see, keeping n
and V (n) Þxed, licensors are constrained to charge (weakly) lower prices when z (n), or equiva-
lently Z (n) ≡ nz (n) , decreases. The following deÞnition thus compares surplus functions V (·)
in the family of functions characterized by a common surplus V (n):
Definition 3. For a Þxed number n of patents, consider two surplus functions: V1 (·) and V2 (·),
with associated Z1 (n) = nz1 (n) and Z2 (n) = nz2 (n), such that V1 (n) = V2 (n). Patents are
more substitutable for surplus function V1 (·) than for surplus function V2 (·) if
Z1 (n) < Z2 (n) .
Note also that, Þxing V (n), the pool price P ∗ depends only on the elasticity of the demand
curve, and not on the substitutability Z(n) among patents. Conversely, Z(n) depends on the
14Suppose n = 3, {V (0) = 0, V (1) = 5, V (2) = 5 and V (3) = 8} (a possible interpretation is that one patent
suffices for a low-quality production, while the full set is necessary for a high-quality one). Then w(n) = 3 while
z(n) = 1.5.
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surplus function V (·), but not on the elasticity of the demand curve. This means that the com-
petition and the demand margins are conceptually distinct. In many respects, the interaction
between the demand and the competition margin is reminiscent of the literature on discrete
choice models (for an overview, see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992)). In models such as
the nested multinomial logit, consumers make choices sequentially, Þrst making a choice among
the options in cluster of goods and then deciding what cluster to purchase. Like the consumers in
a nested model, here the users vary in their preference for the basket of pooled patents relative to
the alternative technology. When choosing between the patents in the pool, however, the users
are homogenous in their preferences.
c) Equilibrium.
Finally, let us put the two possibilities together.
Proposition 1 (symmetric equilibrium in the absence of a pool)
There exists a unique symmetric equilibrium:
(i) If z(n) < bp (i.e., z(n) D0 (Z(n)− V (n)) + D (Z(n)− V (n)) > 0), then licensors are con-
strained only by the competition margin and charge equilibrium price z(n).
(ii) If z(n) > bp (i.e., z(n) D0 (Z(n)− V (n)) + D (Z(n)− V (n)) < 0), then licensors are con-
strained only by the demand margin, and charge price bp.
Proof. If bp > z (n), then there is no equilibrium in which the demand margin binds, since users
would not want to use all patents when licensors charge individual prices bp. The licensors then
charge z (n) each; they cannot raise their price without their license being evicted. They do not
want to lower their price either because prices are already low.15
Conversely, if bp < z (n), then the competition margin cannot bind since licensors would want
to reduce their price in order to boost demand. The symmetric equilibrium has all licensors
15Technically, the revenue piD (pi + (n− 1) z (n)− V (n)) increases with pi at pi = z (n). To see this, recall
that industry marginal revenue D (P − V (n)) + PD0 (P − V (n)) is decreasing in P from the monotone hazard
rate condition; so is, a fortiori, D (P − V (n)) + PnD0 (P − V (n)). And so z (n) < bp implies
D (Z (n)− V (n)) + z (n)D0 (Z (n)− V (n)) > D
³ bP − V (n)´+ bpD0 ³ bP − V (n)´ = 0.
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charge bp.16
3.2 Welfare analysis
We now compare the outcome of a pool in which members are not allowed to grant independent
licenses with that in the absence of a pool. In this section, we analyze the competitive impact
of the formation of a pool of existing patents (the ex post view), without considering the impact
of the formation of the pool on future innovation.17 This approach substantially simpliÞes the
analysis. It is also consistent with the typical approach of antitrust authorities in assessing
proposed pools.
Proposition 2 (normative analysis of pool)
(i) A pool always increases welfare when the demand margin binds in the absence of pool.
(ii) A pool may increase or decrease welfare when the competition margin binds in the absence
of a pool, depending on whether P ∗ ≶ Z(n).
Proof. Part (i) of the proposition results from inequality (4). Part (ii) is a direct corollary of
the fact that each licensor charges z(n) when the competition margin binds in the absence of a
pool.
A simple corollary of Propositions 1 and 2 is
Proposition 3 (substitutability among patents) As patents become more substitutable (in the
sense of DeÞnition 3),
16Interestingly, it can be shown that the competition margin is more likely to bind when the demand grows.
The intuition is that if the demand margin binds, licensors increase their prices when the elasticity decreases.
Licensees are then more tempted to do with a limited set of patents. Let us index the distribution of types
by a parameter γ: F (θ | γ). It is standard to compare distributions through their hazard rates. Parameter γ1
corresponds to a lower demand (and higher elasticity) than parameter γ2 if for all θ
f (θ | γ2)
1− F (θ | γ2)
<
f (θ | γ1)
1− F (θ | γ1)
.
It is then clear that if the competition margin binds for parameter γ1, then it binds a fortiori for parameter γ2.
17Section 7 will take the ex ante view, accounting for the pre pool-formation incentive to engage in R&D and
thus for the impact of the antitrust treatment of pools on the number n of innovations.
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(i) the competition margin is more likely to bind (since it binds if and only if Z(n) ≤ bP ),
(ii) the pool is more likely to decrease welfare (since it does so if and only if Z(n) < P ∗).
The following Þgure summarizes the welfare analysis. It depicts pools falling along a spectrum,
where zero denotes patents that are perfect substitutes and the complementarity between patents
increases along the axis. As noted above, when patents are suitably complementary, the demand
margin will bind instead of the competition margin. The pluses and minuses indicate the impact
of the pool on social welfare. As is clear from the Þgure, while all pools where the demand margin
binds are socially beneÞcial, only some of those where the competition margin binds (those where
the extent of complementarity is the greatest) are.
3.3 Uniqueness
The welfare analysis of section 3.2 is predicated on the independent licensors achieving a sym-
metric equilibrium. While we have shown that there is a unique equilibrium in the class of
symmetric equilibria, we have not investigated the possibility of asymmetric ones. We now do so.
Consider an asymmetric equilibrium conÞguration P =(p1, · · · , pn), where without loss of
generality, p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn. Let P ≡ Σjpj , P−i ≡ Σj 6=ipj; and for a subset J of patents, let
m (J) denote the number of patents in that subset and PJ ≡ Σj∈Jpj.
The highest price, zi, that patent holder i can charge without her patent being evicted from
the basket of patents is now licensor-speciÞc. It is uniquely deÞned by:
V (n)− P−i − zi = max
J3/ i
{V (m (J))− PJ} . (6)
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The left-hand side of (6) is the net surplus when the user buys all patents. The right-hand
side of (6) is the users net surplus obtained by evicting patent i from the basket.18
The following proposition (proved in the Appendix) contains this sections main insights:
Proposition 4 (asymmetric equilibria)
(i) An asymmetric equilibrium, if it exists, is characterized by:
Either licensor i is constrained by the demand margin (i ∈ D) and then pi = bp > zi, wherebpD0 (P − V (n)) + D (P − V (n)) = 0; or licensor i is constrained by the competition margin
(i ∈ C) and then pi = zi ≤ bp.
(ii) There exists no asymmetric equilibrium (and therefore the symmetric equilibrium is unique)
when the surplus function V (·) is concave.
(iii) There may exist asymmetric equilibria for non-concave surplus functions.
(iv) In case of multiple equilibria, the symmetric equilibrium is also the highest industry-proÞt
equilibrium.
The intuition for part (iv) is that for a given total price, the users option to buy a subset
of patents only is more attractive when there is price dispersion. In this sense licensors feel
more competitive pressure in an asymmetric than in a symmetric equilibrium. In the following
(except of course when we consider asymmetric surplus functions in section 5), we will focus on
the symmetric equilibrium.
4 Independent licenses as a screening mechanism
Patent owners who request a statement of the Department of Justices antitrust enforcement
intentions with respect to a proposed pool arrangement usually include the provision that the
individual patents that are part of the pool may still be licensed from the original patents
18Actually, one could restrict attention to the subset J of patents with prices equal to or smaller than pi: if
patent i is evicted from the basket, so will any strictly more expensive patent k (pk > pi), since otherwise the
users would be better off keeping patent i and dispensing with patent k.
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owners.19 In contrast with a merger, thus, the patent owners (the counterparts of the merging
parties) still act independently and keep marketing their own intellectual property. They just
agree to market a jointly produced good  the package license  at some pre-agreed price 
(the package price).
This common provision raises two related questions: First, what is the cost for pool members
of including this provision (given that the pool administrator could offer individual patent licenses
and not only the package license20)? Second, would it be optimal for antitrust authorities to insist
on this provision?
We assume that pool members share royalties equally and consider a two-stage game following
the constitution of the pool:
(i) The pool chooses a price P for its bundle.
(ii) Owners non-cooperatively and simultaneously set license prices (p1,p2, · · · ,pn) for their indi-
vidual patents. Users then choose among a) not buying at all, b) buying the package from
the pool, c) buying some or all the individual licences.
To break ties, we assume that if V (n)− P ≥ max
J
{V (m(J))− PJ}, users dont buy individual
licenses. Fixing P , an equilibrium of stage (ii) is called a continuation equilibrium. The stage
(i) choice of P maximizes the representative members proÞt, anticipating the subsequent stage
(ii) equilibrium. Regarding the latter continuation equilibrium, it may be unique (and then
symmetric if stake holdings in the pool are equal) or there may also exist asymmetric equilibria,
depending on the technology. Similarly, the potential multiplicity of equilibria in the absence of
a pool (Proposition 4) may render the welfare analysis of a pool ambiguous. This section focuses
on symmetric equilibria (both in the absence of a pool, or with a pool allowing independent
19The independent licensing provision is by no means speciÞc to the recent pools that have obtained review
letters from the Department of Justice. As noted above, nearly half the pools in the Lerner et al (2002) sample
allow independent licensing.
20For different speciÞcations of user preferences, the pool might want to issue sublicenses; but recall that we
have chosen licensees preferences so that it is optimal for the pool to offer only the package license.
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licensing). Proposition 6 (iv) below, applied to the symmetric case, provides insights that are
similar, but not based on symmetric equilibrium selections.
Definition 4: Consider a pool with symmetric stake holdings. The pool is strongly stable to
independent licensing if, when the pool charges P∗ (the pool-proÞt maximizing price when there
is no independent licensing), in all symmetric pure-strategy equilibria of stage (ii) users buy solely
from the pool. The pool is weakly unstable to independent licensing if whenever the pool charges
a price exceeding the total price charged in the absence of a pool, there exists an equilibrium in
which the patent owners all charge z (n) and users buy individual licenses. The pool is strongly
unstable if whenever the pool charges a price exceeding the total price charged in the absence of a
pool, patent owners all charge z (n) and users buy individual licenses in all symmetric equilibria
of stage (ii).
In words (and focusing again on symmetric equilibria), (i) independent licensing is irrelevant
for a strongly stable pool, (ii) independent licensing undoes pool formation in the case of a
strongly unstable pool, and (iii) there exists an equilibrium that undoes the pool in the case of
a weakly unstable pool.
Proposition 5 (independent licensing by pool members)
Consider a pool with symmetric stake holdings.
(i) A welfare-enhancing pool is strongly stable to independent licensing by pool members.
(ii) A welfare-decreasing pool is weakly unstable for all n, and is strongly unstable for n = 2.
Furthermore, the pool cannot avoid this instability through asymmetric stake holdings: For any
stake holdings distribution, and for any pool price P > Z(n), there exists an equilibrium in which
all licensors charge z(n), and this equilibrium is the unique equilibrium for n = 2.
Proof : (i) Consider, Þrst, a welfare-enhancing pool:
P ∗ < eP ≡ min ³Z(n) , bP´.
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Existence: Let all patent owners charge ep = eP/n at stage (ii). And so all users buy from the
pool. To raise proÞt, an individual licensor must reduce its price sufficiently so that the total
price P falls below P ∗. Because an individual price decrease never leads to the eviction of patents
from the package, this licensors proÞt is then
[P − (n− 1) ep]D (P − V (n)) < ·P − (n− 1) P
n
¸
D (P − V (n))
<
P ∗
n
D (P ∗ − V (n))
since, by deÞnition, P ∗ maximizes D (P − V (n)). So, licensors cannot gain by changing their
price.
Uniqueness: Suppose that users purchase individual licenses rather than from the pool (they then
buy all of them, since a patent holder whose patent was not included in the basket would reduce
her price sufficiently so as to have it included). Furthermore, all licenses sell at the same price
in a symmetric continuation equilibrium. Let P denote the price of the basket of all individual
licenses, with P < P ∗. Because P < P ∗ < Z(n),
V (n)− P > max
m
½
V (m)−m P
n
¾
.
And because P < P ∗ < bP , PD0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) > 0, and so, a fortiori:
P
n
D0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) > 0.
Hence, each licensor would like to increase the price of her individual license and can do so
because she is unconstrained by the competition margin, a contradiction.
(ii) Consider now a welfare-decreasing pool (Z(n) < P ∗).
Existence: Consider a pool package price P > Z(n), and let all patent owners charge z(n) each,
and so users buy individual licenses rather than from the pool. We know from section 3 that
no one would want to deviate by charging less than z(n) (section 3 applies because the pools
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package offer remains irrelevant when one owner reduces her price). Conversely, if owner i charges
pi > z(n), patent i is evicted from the basket of individual licences. Furthermore, users still buy
individual licenses since, by deÞnition,
max
m<n
{V (m)−m z(n)} = V (n)− Z(n) > V (n)− P.
Uniqueness (for n = 2 ): Suppose that the pool charges P > Z(2), and that users buy from the
pool. Then the payoff of an owner with (at most) a 50% ownership stake is (at most):
P
2
D (P − V (2)) .
Alternatively, the owner could contemplate selling an individual license at price p (slightly
below the level) given by:
V (1)− p = V (2)− P.
It then makes
p D (p− V (1)) = [P − Z(2)]D (p− V (2)) > P
2
D (P − V (2)) .
Hence the pool is strongly unstable. ¥
This claim is borne out by the analysis in Lerner et al. (2002). This paper estimates a
set of simultaneous equations to predict the structure of pools formed before the mid-1990s.
One equation estimates a latent variable, an index of the extent that the patents in the pool
are substitutes or complements (independent variables include the date of pool formation and an
indicator if the pool was subsequently identiÞed as violating antitrust laws). This measure proves
to be highly signiÞcant in explaining the use of independent licensing: pools whose patents are
more likely to be complements are more likely to allow licensing by individual Þrms.
5 Asymmetric patents
Patents may be asymmetric in two related ways. First, a patent may improve on a pre-existing
one, but its value added is obtained only if the two patents are combined. The former, called a
subservient patent, is then valueless on a stand-alone basis. The latter, called the dominant
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patent, can by contrast be licensed on a stand-alone basis. User θ then obtains gross surplus
θ + V (2) from the two patents combined, θ + V (1) from the dominant patent only, and 0 from
the subservient patent only.21
Second, patents contributions to total surplus may be different. Some may be minor patents
while others are key to the technology. We formalize this in our set-up by assigning contribution
ni ∈ [0, n] to patent i, with the normalization
nX
i=1
ni = n.
So, in the symmetric case, ni = 1 for all i. Let xi = 1 if user θ obtains a license for patent i and
xi = 0 otherwise. User θ s gross surplus is then:22
θ + V
Ã
nX
i=1
xini
!
.
Because asymmetric patterns in general require asymmetric ownership stakes in the pool in order
for a pool allowing independent licensing to be viable, we let αi denote a patent owner is share
of the royalties collected by the pool, with
nX
i=1
αi = 1.
The following proposition, proved in the appendix, generalizes some of the analysis of sections
3 and 4 to the case in which contributions are unequal, but, for all i, patent is contribution ni
can be reaped regardless of the combination of patents:
21The user always has the choice of not using the subservient patent (free disposal).
22For n = 2 (or more generally, in the context covered by the corollary below), the former form of asymmetry
can be subsumed in the latter form by assigning to the dominant and subservient patents contributions n1 and
n2 with n1 > n2 and redeÞning the surplus function:eV (2) = V (2) , eV (n1) = V (1) , and eV (ni) = −∞ for ni < n1 (together with free disposal). This may no longer
be so with more than two patents. For example, patent 3 may add as much to patent 1 and to patent 2, but may
be subservient to patent 1 (i.e., build on its design), but be autonomous with respect to patent 2.
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Proposition 6 (asymmetric importance)
Suppose that the gross surplus of a type θ user from adopting the technology is θ+ V
µ
nP
i=1
xini
¶
,
where xi = 1 if the user obtains a license for patent i and xi = 0 otherwise,
nP
i=1
ni = n, and
n1 ≤ n2 · · · ≤ nn.
(i) In the absence of a pool, there exists m, 1 ≤ m ≤ n, such that licensors 1 through m are
constrained by the competition margin and charge their (licensor-speciÞc) price pi = zi above
which their patent is evicted from the basket, whereas the most important patents m+ 1 through
n are constrained by the demand margin and all charge the same price bp (with zi < bp for all
i ≤ m).
(ii) If in (i), m < n (so at least one licensor is constrained by the demand margin in the absence
of pool), a pool is welfare-enhancing.
(iii) When the surplus function is concave, the equilibrium in the absence of a pool is unique,
and more valuable patents are more expensive (p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · pn).
(iv) If all equilibria in the absence of a pool yield total price P > P ∗, where P ∗D
0
(P ∗ − V (n)) +
D (P ∗ − V (n)) = 0, (and so a pool is welfare enhancing), then for appropriate stakes in the pool
the continuation equilibrium is unique and has users buy from the pool (independent licensing is
irrelevant).
If all equilibria in the absence of a pool yield total price P < P ∗ (and so a pool is welfare
decreasing), then, regardless of the distribution of stake holdings, whenever the pool attempts
to charge a price above the maximum of these equilibrium prices, there exists a continuation
equilibrium in which users purchase only individual licenses; for n = 2, users purchase only
individual licences in any continuation equilibrium.
Regarding the impact of independent licensing, Proposition 6 (iv) is stronger than Proposition
5 if the equilibrium in the absence of a pool is unique (e.g., in the concave-surplus-function case).
In general, though, it is neither weaker nor stronger: While it does not presume a focus on
symmetric equilibria, it assumes that equilibria in the absence of a pool all yield a higher or a
lower price than the pool.
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Application to dominant / subservient patents.
Let us assume that patent 1 is dominant, and patents 2, · · · , n subservient (that is, value-
less unless combined with patent 1). Using parts ii) and iv) of Proposition 6, the antitrust
implications of pools are rather straightforward in this case:
Corollary: With the asymmetric, dominant / subservient pattern,
(i) independent licenses are irrelevant (the pool is strongly stable) when members can freely bargain
over their respective stakes, and
(ii) pools unambiguously enhance welfare.
The key to understanding why pools are always welfare enhancing here is to note that, by
assumption, the subservient patents are valueless on a stand-alone basis, and so in the absence of
a pool the demand margin always binds for the dominant patent ; this property creates a potential
double marginalization, and thereby a potential social gain to the formation of a pool.23
6 Licensors are also licensees
We have until now analyzed pools whose members are upstream patent owners and license to
third-party downstream users. Let us now allow licensors to be also licensees. Two competition-
policy issues then arise:
23In equilibrium, patent owners grant the dominant patent owner a sufficient stake α1 in the pool so as not to
encourage her to license her property independently. One can show that
α1 ≥ α∗1 ≡
P ∗ − [V (n)− V (1)]
P ∗
,
where P ∗, as earlier, maximizes pool proÞt PD (V (n)).
Gilbert (2002) looks at a two-patent situation in which the Þrst patent is dominant and the second patent is
subservient. As in part (ii) of the corollary, a pool increases welfare. Gilbert shows that that welfare can be
further increased by having Firm 1 (the owner of the Þrst patent) license the patent (without royalties) to Firm
2 while still licensing directly to end users. Then Firm 2, which has a superior offering as it combines the two
patents, competes against Firm 1, acting as a fringe when licensing the Þrst patent. Gilberts Firm 2 is then
equivalent to a patent pool in which Firm 1 has no stake.
Gilberts result does not contradict part (i) of the corollary. Indeed, independent licenses are irrelevant as long
as the members can choose the stakes held by each member of the pool. The pool members choose a large enough
stake for the dominant patents owner so as to deter her from competing with the pools offer.
More generally, stake ownership must match patent importance in order for the pool to be stable to independent
licensing, which is a fairly intuitive requirement.
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 foreclosure: the licensors may not want to create their own competition downstream by
licensing to third parties;
 raising each others cost : licensors may want to raise each others cost by charging royalties
in cross-licensing or pool agreements.
The two concerns are distinct. The possibility of foreclosure arises quite generally, whether
or not licensors can charge royalties on the usage of the technology. The latter question does not
arise when licensors can charge only Þxed fees in licensing contracts. We study the two issues
in sequence, each time focusing on only one issue for a clean analysis. Our study of foreclosure
assumes that only Þxed-fee licenses are possible (the extent of usage of the technology is not
metered), in order to eliminate the raise-each-others-cost strategy. The study of the latter
strategy by way of contrast assumes that there are no third-party downstream competitors, and
so openness of access to the technology is not an issue.
The contribution of this section is of course not the identiÞcation of these two (standard)
issues, but rather the study of what they imply as to the desirability of pools.
6.1 Foreclosure
Our theory generalizes easily to the introduction of downstream competition as long as licensing
contracts take the form of Þxed fees and the technology helps reduce downstream users Þxed
cost (e.g., the cost of writing software). Consider the following simple situation (as the reader
will see, both the insights and the approach extend to more complex environments). There are,
as in sections 2 through 4, n symmetric owners of intellectual property. These n owners are each
in one of n separate downstream markets, and initially command a monopoly position in that
market. In each market, there is one potential entrant. The entrant cannot enter without access
to the technology, and if it enters, obtains gross duopoly proÞt
πd + θ + V (m)
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when using m ≤ n patents. So, πd can be viewed as the ex post duopoly proÞt and θ + V (m)
as (minus) the entry cost. The market i entrants draw θ from distribution F (θ) is private
information to the entrant.
An incumbents gross proÞt is πm if it remains a monopolist and πd < πm if it becomes a
duopolist.24 The case in which the licensors are not integrated downstream can be obtained as
a special case of our analysis, by setting πm = πd in the equations below (so there is no proÞt
loss for the licensors in the downstream market in case of entry). We assume that the Þnal
consumers welfare is higher under entry.
In the absence of pool, the game proceeds as follows:
 (i) Licensors set non-discriminatory prices {pi} for their individual licenses.
 (ii) Entrants 1 through n decide whether to enter their respective markets, and, if they do,
which licenses to purchase.
 (iii) Product market competition in the n markets occurs.
Stages (i) and (ii) of the timing for the pool and pool-with-independent licensing are modiÞed
appropriately.25 We focus on symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 7 (vertical integration)
(i) In the absence of pool, when the competition margin is binding, prices are the same (z(n)
for individual licenses, Z(n) = nz(n) in total) as when the licensors are not vertically integrated
with the incumbent monopolies. They are higher than under non-integration when the demand
242πd may exceed πm, that is, entry may be proÞtable for the industry. But we will not need to make this
assumption. Even a pool may want to offer licenses when πm > 2πd, because the entrants may beneÞt from the
technology in other (undescribed) markets.
Note also that we have assumed the patent-owners entry cost is sunk; or, equivalently, if the patent-owners
need access to technology covered by others patents, they will cross-license for free with each other (as it is
optimal for them to do so).
25For a pool: (i) The pool sets price P for the package. (ii) Entrants 1 through n decide whether to enter their
respective markets by buying the package. For a pool with independent licensing, there is a prior stage in which
the pool price P is set. Then: (i) Licensors set non-discriminatory prices for their individual licences.
(ii) Entrants 1 through n decide whether to enter their respective markets and, if they do, which licenses to
purchase (either a set of individual licenses or the pools package offer).
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margin binds. Hence, vertical integration makes it more likely that the competition margin binds.
(ii) Vertical integration raises the pools price P ∗.
(iii) As in Proposition 2, a pool increases welfare if the demand margin binds in the absence of
a pool. It increases or decreases welfare when the competition margin binds in the absence of a
pool, depending on whether P ∗ ≷ Z(n).
(iv) Proposition 5 (on independent licensing) is still valid.
Proof.
Pool : Let us start with the case of a pool. The representative (vertically integrated) members
proÞt is
max
P
©£
1−D ¡P − V (n)− πd¢¤πm + £D ¡P − V (n)− πd¢¤ £πd + P ¤ª
⇐⇒ max
P
©£
P − ¡πm − πd¢¤D ¡P − V (n)− πd¢ª.
Thus, everything is as if the licensors incurred a marginal licensing cost equal to πm − πd.
No pool : As in section 3, we must consider the two cases in which the demand and competition
margins are binding. Suppose, Þrst, that the demand margin is binding. Licensor i solves:
max
pi
 (n− 1) piD
¡
pi + P−i − V (n)− πd
¢
+
£
1−D ¡pi + P−i − V (n)− πd¢¤πm + £D ¡pi + P−i − V (n)− πd¢¤ £πd + pi¤
 .
In words, licensor i de facto is a pure licensor in (n − 1) markets, and is both a licensor and a
licensee in her own market. Licensor i therefore solves:
max
pi
½·
pi −
µ
πm − πd
n
¶¸
D
¡
pi + P−i − V (n)− πd
¢¾
.
Comparing this program to that of the pool, note that individual licensing introduces two oppo-
site biases: a) multiple marginalization (as in section 3), and b) non-internalization of the proÞt
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destruction impact of entry for the (n − 1) other licensors. The former effect however always
dominates the latter.26
This implies that if the demand margin is binding, a pool reduces the total price. It also
increases welfare: a lower price beneÞts both downstream entrants (the direct users of the tech-
nology) and the Þnal consumers (who beneÞt indirectly through increased entry).
The analysis of the competition margin is unchanged relative to section 3 . z(n) is still deÞned
as the maximal possible price p satisfying:
V (n)− np = max
m<n
{V (m)−mp} .
In the absence of a pool, licensors constrained by the competition margin have no ability to
lower the users net surplus (since each, by deÞnition, is indifferent between using all patents
and dropping some), and so the fact that the licensors are also downstream users is irrelevant.
Put differently, the prices are the same as if the licensors were not vertically integrated with
downstream incumbents.
Last, the proof of Proposition 5 carries over to the vertical integration case. ¥
6.2 Royalties in closed-pool agreements
In order to clearly distinguish the two concerns, we now assume that the pool does not offfer
licenses to third parties (there are none, say), but can collect royalties. Its n members form a
symmetric n-Þrm downstream oligopoly. Members pay royalty rate (or access charge) a to the
pool, whose proÞt is then redistributed equally among its members. For simplicity, let us assume
that n = 2.
26The Þrst-order condition in the absence of a pool is"
Pˆ − ¡πm − πd¢
n
#
D0
³ bP − V (n)− πd´+D ³ bP − V (n)− πd´ = 0,
and for a pool: £
P ∗ − ¡πm − πd¢¤D0 ¡P ∗ − V (n)− πd¢+D ¡P ∗ − V (n)− πd¢ = 0.
So marginal revenue is smaller in the case of a pool, and because marginal revenues are decreasing, bP > P ∗.
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Patent owners who are also downstream competitors will never want to join a pool, if the
pooling of their patents make them undifferentiated. To account for pool formation we therefore
assume that the two Þrms are differentiated in two ways (the following analysis is inspired by the
double differentiation model in Hausman et al. (2003)).27 The Þrst dimension of differentiation
is technology unrelated; the two Þrms are located at the two extremes of an Hotelling segment
[0, 1]. Consumers are located uniformly on the segment and incur unit transportation cost t.
Second, patents 1 and 2 describe two technologies that are differently suited to the needs
of the consumers. Namely, patents 1 and 2 are located at the two extremes of an Hotelling
segment [0, 1], and consumers are uniformly28 distributed along that segment (independent of
their location in the other dimension), with transportation cost u per unit of distance. Pooling
the patents then allows Þrms to offer a better service to consumers: each can offer the patent
1- and patent 2-enabled versions and so consumers haver a better match for their needs. To
capture the demand augmentation effect in a tractable way (that is, not interferring with the
double-differentiation analysis), let us assume that users are ex ante identical.29 At search or
set up cost s, they adapt their technology to that covered by the two patents, and learn about
their own locations in the two spaces. We assume that the hazard rate g/G is decreasing so as
to guarantee the quasi-concavity of proÞt functions.
The following proposition, proved in the appendix, shows that a per-se rule against royalties
charged to pool members may reduce welfare to the extent that it discourages the formation of
an otherwise desirable pool:
Proposition 8 (i) There exists a(t,u) ≥ 0 and a(t,u) such that a pool increases patent-owners
proÞt if and only if a ∈ [a(t, u) , a(t, u)].
(ii) Firms may have too little incentive to form a pool if a is constrained to be equal to 0. In
27Alternatively, we could assume that cross-licenses reduce the Þrms marginal cost from, say, c1 to c2 < c1.
The analysis is then unsurprising (and well-known). As long as the industry proÞt decreases with marginal cost
(a reasonable assumption), the Þrms are willing to enter royalty-free cross-licensing arrangements. Royalties then
unambiguously reduce welfare, unlike here.
28The results in Hausman et al. (2003) hold for arbitrary distributions. The assumption of uniform distributions
is used here to show that the markup increases with differentiation, and is much stronger than needed.
29This simpliÞcation is also used in Hausman et al (2003).
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particular, a no-royalty pool never forms if the Þrms are little differentiated along the non-patent-
related dimension.
(iii) The socially optimal royalty rate among those that induce the Þrms to form a pool is a = a.
7 Impact on innovation: the ex ante view
Until now, the welfare analysis has followed antitrust practice in taking the ex post perspective
for reviewing the impact of a pool. But the prospect of being able to form a pool also affects the
incentive to innovate.30 So suppose that an innovator can bring about innovation n+ 1 at some
investment cost I.31 Does allowing pools increase innovation and welfare?
The answer to the Þrst question is straightforward: Innovators enter a pool only if this
increases their proÞt. So, the prospect of a pool raises individual proÞt and thereby encourages
innovation. It is only in the extreme case in which the entrant has no bargaining power in the
negotiation that the possibility of forming a pool does not boost innovation.
The impact of a pool on the ex ante welfare is more complex. As the industrial organization
literature has repeatedly emphasized, markets can deliver too much or too little innovation,
and so the impact of pools is likely to be ambiguous. The case of too much innovation in
our context can be illustrated by assuming that n = 1 (monopoly licensor initially) and that the
entrants innovation is a perfect substitute for the incumbents. Hence, when pools are prohibited,
the entrant faces the prospect of Bertrand competition and does not enter. Allowing pools
then induces wasteful business stealing (or entry for buyout, in the terminology of Rasmusen
(1988)). As long as I is smaller than half of the monopoly proÞt (I < [maxPD(P − V (1))]/2)
and bargaining powers of the two parties are equal, the entrant enters, without any beneÞt for
the consumers. Welfare is just reduced by I.
There is, however, some hope of being able to overcome the usual ambiguity as to the ex
30Such an approach is in line with Denicolo (2002), who considers sequential innovation in a two-stage patent
race model and argues that the prospect of an agreement between the owners of competing, sequential, but
non-infringing patents increases investment in the second innovation and may raise welfare.
31Alternatively, one could look at n potential innovators, each considering whether to invest I to bring about
their innovation.
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ante welfare impact of policies. Intuitively, such business-stealing or entry-for-buyout excess
innovation should be related to cases in which the innovation produces patents that are somewhat
substitutable with the existing ones. Our analysis shows that the corresponding pools can be
screened out by the requirement of independent licensing by pool members. In particular, ex
post welfare decreasing pools have no impact on innovation once independent licensing is allowed.
We leave it to future research to provide a general answer to the question of whether ex post
welfare enhancing pools are also ex ante welfare increasing. We content ourselves with the much
more limited, yet interesting following result (proof available upon request from the authors):
Proposition 9 (ex ante view).
Suppose that n = 1 and demand is linear (the distribution F of users types is uniform). Then
allowing a pool with independent licensing (if innovation occurs) never reduces and may increase
welfare.
8 Summary and discussion
The paper has built a tractable model of a patent portfolio, that allows for the full range of
complementarity/substitutability. In the absence of pool, the demand margin binds if an increase
in the license price of a patent leads to a reduction in the demand for the patent basket; the
competition margin binds if it leads to the exclusion of the patent from the basket selected by
users. Let us Þrst summarize the main insights:
a) A pool is more likely to be welfare-enhancing if patents are more complementary. That the
demand margin binds in the absence of pool is a sufficient, but not a necessary, condition for a
pool to be welfare-enhancing.
b) A pool is never affected by the possibility of independent licensing if and only if the pool
is welfare-enhancing. Furthermore, with only two patents, independent licensing always yields
the same outcome as in the absence of a pool if the pool is welfare-decreasing in the absence of
independent licenses. With more than two patents and a welfare-decreasing pool, there exists an
independent-licensing equilibrium with the same outcome as in the absence of a pool.
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c) The results generalize to a setting where the patents vary in importance. Furthermore, when
one patent is dominant (so that the other patents cannot be used without it), a patent pool
unambiguously boosts welfare.
d) When pool members are also downstream users, two additional concerns may emerge: pool
members may be reluctant to create competitors by licensing to third parties, and licensors may
seek to raise each others cost by charging royalties. Regarding the Þrst possibility, we show
that the results generalize as long as licensing contracts takes the form of Þxed fees and the
licensed technology reduces downstream users Þxed costs. We consider the impact of royalties
in a setting where there are no third-party licensees. We show that if royalties are not allowed,
welfare may be harmed as otherwise-desirable pools are discouraged from being formed.
e) Allowing a pool encourages innovation. Determining the impact on ex ante social welfare,
however, is likely to be much more difficult: as the literature has emphasized, competition can
lead to too much or too little innovation. While we are unable to provide a general answer to this
question, we are able to show that under certain conditions, allowing a pool with independent
licensing never reduces and may increase ex ante welfare.
This paper is a Þrst step in the analysis of pools comprised of patents that may not be perfect
complements or perfect substitutes, and of the criteria that should be employed by competition
authorities in their review of pools. Looking forward, our theoretical understanding of patent
pools should be deepened in several directions:
 First, our assumption of separability of user preferences, while simplifying the analysis,
focused it on package licensing and ruled out price discrimination through menus.
 Second, we have assumed an all-or-nothing pool. In practice, pools may be formed with a
subset of the relevant patents, which raises the interesting issue of holdouts.
 Third, pools often seem to reßect equal-treatment preoccupations despite asymmetries
in the importance of innovations, in the status of members (licensing and non-licensing
owners), or in the ability to clone another members innovation; theoretical work should
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be devoted to the understanding of equal treatment in such circumstances.
 Last, one would want to compare the merits of pools and standard setting processes.
These and many other important questions related to pools lie outside the limited scope of this
paper, which we hope will encourage research in these directions.
The phenomena that we have studied here extend well beyond patent pools. There are a
large number of arrangements that share important elements with patent pools. In particular,
the provision by multiple Þrms of a bundle of goods or services that are at least partially comple-
mentary is commonplace. At the same time, however, none of these arrangements exactly mimic
the pool structure. In particular, it is rare to see a new centralized organization established
to administer these arrangements. Rather, the arrangements are typically governed through a
contract that spells out the key roles and responsibilities of each party.
To cite one example, airlines have undertaken collaborations since the 1960s, which involve
the joint sale of seats. Today, these are known as code sharing arrangements. Essentially, a code
sharing agreement allows each airline to sell seats on the others planes. As part of the agreement,
there is compensation paid from the one airline to the other, according to a negotiated formula.
For instance, a passenger can buy a single ticket from Atlanta to Toulouse from either Delta
or Air France, even if the Atlanta-to-Paris leg is on Delta and the Paris-to-Toulouse leg is on
Air France. While the passenger could alternatively purchase both segments from respective
airlines, the purchase price of the combined ticket is lower. (For a systematic analysis of the
impact of these agreements on ticket pricing, see Brueckner and Whalen (2000).) In many cases,
the airlines in these agreements have signiÞcant number of overlapping routes, making them both
substitutes and complements with each other. In some cases, the two parties are free to sell seats
at whatever price they see Þt, which is similar to the independent licensing case discussed above.
To cite another example, newspapers will frequently offer package-advertising rates. In some
cases, the papers are clearly complements: for instance, a number of independent suburban
newspapers will allow an individual to place a classiÞed advertisement selling a used car for
a fraction of the cost of purchasing the advertisement in each of the papers individually. In
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other cases, competing newspapers offer package rates," sometimes in conjunction with the
establishment of a joint marketing department. For instance, in February 2002, the Mirror Group
Newspapers, one of the national newspaper arms of Trinity Mirror Group, announced plans to
form a joint advertising venture with the Telegraph Group. The joint venture would allow both
groups to cut costs by combining the sales teams of the Telegraph, Sunday Telegraph, Daily
Mirror, and Sunday Mirror. The group would sell ads both for the individual papers as well as
jointly for the two papers. (Thus, there is no analog to independent licensing in this case.) One
most common manifestation of such arrangements in the U.S. (with over two dozen formed) are
joint operating agreements (JOAs) between newspapers that are directly competitive, where
advertising is jointly marketed and the proÞts are split accord to a formula. An example is
Seattles two newspapers  the Times and the Post-Intelligencer  who since 1983 have published
separate newspapers with combined business, advertising and circulation operations. The two
papers have separate editorial staffs that produce the news content of the two papers. The
Times sells advertising and prints and distributes both papers (again, there is no analogy to
independent licensing in this setting). All advertising is apparently sold as a package, and
allocated according to a formula to the two papers. It is clear that in many of these agreements
the newspapers involved are substitutes, though in some cases they are differentiated by the time
of day at which the papers are published or by the demographic segments targeted by the papers.
These illustrative examples highlight the extent to which the issues examined in this paper
extend beyond the conÞnes of patent pools. It is our hope that our research will stimulate
economic analyses of co-marketing agreements more generally.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) Part (i) restates the deÞnition of the demand and competition margins. Just note that all
prices in D, if any, are equal since they must satisfy:
piD
0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) = 0.
(A1)
(ii) In any equilibrium, pi ≤ w(n) for all i. But when V (·) is concave, V (n) − V (m) ≥
(n−m)w(m) and so:
V (n)− P ≥ V (m (J))− PJ for all J .
And so a patent holder can charge up to w(n) without being evicted; hence zi = w(n) = z(n)
for all i. Now, use part (i). Let p0 denote the solution to (A1). Either p0 < z(n) and then all
licensors charge p0 (since z(n)D0(P−V (n))+D(P−V (n)) < p0D0(P−V (n))+D(P−V (n)) = 0).
Or p0 ≥ z(n) and then all Þrms charge z(n) (since they would be excluded otherwise). So any
equilibrium must be symmetric.
(iii) This can be demonstrated by way of an example: Take n = 3; licensors 1 and 2 charge pL
and licensor 3 charges pH > pL, where
V (1)− pL = V (3)− 2pL − pH ,
and
V (2) = V (1)
This is indeed an asymmetric equilibrium, in which the competition margin binds for all, as long
as
pHD
0 (P − V (3)) +D (P − V (3)) ≥ 0
(which can be obtained by appropriately choosing the demand function).
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(iv) Start from an asymmetric equilibrium with total price P . If D is non-empty, let p0 denote
the solution to (A1); raise the prices of licensors constrained by the competition margin and
lower those of licensors constrained by the demand margin, keeping the total price constant:
δpi =
½
∆ for i ∈ C
−#C
#D
∆ for i ∈ D
If no licensor is constrained by the demand margin, deÞne D as the set of patents with the
highest price and C as the complementary set and perform the same operation of reduction of
price dispersion keeping total price constant. Note that for the highest price pn , pnD
0
+D ≥ 0.
Let p0 ≡ pn. In either case, choose ∆ such that
max
C
{pi}+∆ = p0 − #C
#D
∆ ≡ p1.
Note that the new set of prices, P1, satisÞes two properties:
(a) no patent is evicted from the basket, since on the one hand, the total price P is unchanged,
and on the other hand, the total price of the m cheapest patents has not decreased, for all
m.
(b) p1D
0
(P − V (n)) +D(P − V (n)) > 0.
Now iterate the process, with D augmented (and C reduced) by the patent holders whose price
was previously max
C
{pi}. One thus obtains sets of prices P1, P2, · · · that satisfy properties (a)
and (b). In the Þnal iteration, all prices are equal (and equal to P/n) and from (a) and (b),
satisfy:
(a) V (n)− P ≥ max
m
½
V (m)−m P
n
¾
⇐⇒ Z (n) ≥ P ,
and
(b)
P
n
D0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) > 0⇐⇒ bP > P ,
where bP was deÞned in section 3.
Since the symmetric equilibrium has total price min
n bP , Z (n)o, and
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P ≤ min
nbP , Z (n)o ,
the asymmetric equilibrium is preferred by users to the symmetric one. ¥
Proof of Proposition 6
(i) Let P denote the total price in the absence of pool. Licensors unconstrained by the competition
margin charge pi satisfying
piD
0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) = 0,
and so all such licensors charge the same price, bp say. The others are constrained by the com-
petition margin: They would like to raise their prices (in that pi < bp), but cannot because their
patent would be evicted from the basket chosen by users. They therefore charge zi given by
V (n)− P = max
{x |xi = 0}
{V (Σjxjnj)−Σjxjpj} ,
where x ≡ (x1, · · · ,xn).
(ii) If in the absence of pool,
pnD
0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) = 0,
then
(P −Σj<npj)D0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) = 0,
and hence
PD0 (P − V (n)) +D (P − V (n)) < 0,
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implying that P > P ∗. So, a pool is welfare enhancing.
(iii) If V (·) is concave, then by the same proof as in Proposition 4:
zi = V (n)− V (n−i),
where n−i ≡ Σj 6=inj.
Because n−i is (weakly) decreasing, zi is (weakly) increasing. Together with (i), this implies
that the most valuable patents command higher prices (p1 ≤ p2 ≤ · · · ≤ pn).
To demonstrate uniqueness, deÞne
MR (bp) ≡ bpD0 (P (bp)− V (n)) +D (P (bp)− V (n)) ,
where
P (bp) ≡ m(bp)X
i=1
zi + [n−m (bp)] bp,
and m (bp) is uniquely deÞned by
zm(bp) ≤ bp < zm(bp)+1 (and m (bp) = 0 if bp < z1 , m (bp) = n if bp > zn).
P (bp) is continuously increasing andMR (bp) continuously decreasing in bp. Hence, ifMR (z1) ≤ 0,
all licensors are constrained by the demand margin and their common price is given byMR (bp) =
0 and satisÞes bp < z1 ≤ z2 ≤ · · · zn. If MR (zn) ≥ 0, all licensors are constrained by the
competition margin and pi = zi for all i. Last, if MR (z1) > 0 > MR (zn), there is a unique bp in
(z1 , zn) satisfying MR (bp) = 0. Licensors i ≤ m (bp) are constrained by the competition margin
and charge zi, and the others charge bp.
(iv) Let P = Σipi > P ∗ denote an equilibrium total price in the absence of pool, and pick shares
αi in the pool satisfying:
αi ≥ pi − (P − P
∗)
P ∗
.
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[This is doable as Σi
µ
pi − (P − P ∗)
P ∗
¶
=
nP ∗ − (n− 1)P
P ∗
< 1.]
First, note that {pi} (the no-pool equilibrium) is a pure-strategy equilibrium of the indepen-
dent licensing stage, in which independent licenses arent sold. By deÞnition, pi is a best response
to the other licensors price vector p−i in the absence of the pools package offer. To upset this
offer, licensor i would have to lower her price to pi − (P − P ∗) or below. She does not want to
go below this level from the concavity of her objective function in the absence of pool. Licensor
is therefore does not want to deviate as long as
[pi − (P − P ∗)]D (P ∗ − V (n)) ≤ αiP ∗D (P ∗ − V (n)) ,
which is guaranteed by the choice of stakes. Second, uniqueness (for such a choice of stakes) is
guaranteed by the fact that a pure-strategy equilibrium in which P < P ∗, and so the pool is
upset, must, from the local optimality conditions, also be an equilibrium of the no-pool game.
By assumption, all such equilibria involve total price above P ∗, a contradiction.
Consider next the highest total price P = Σipi among equilibria in the absence of pool. And
suppose P < P ∗ and that the pool is trying to sustain P > P . Then, we know from part (ii)
that every licensor is competition constrained in (any) equilibrium in the absence of pool. Hence
suppose that at the independent licensing substage each licensor i charges pi. As in the proof of
Proposition 5 noone can raise its price and induce users to buy from the pool (and so stakes in
the pool are irrelevant). Hence price P cannot be sustained and the pool is weakly unstable.
Last, for n = 2, there is a unique equilibrium; in this equilibrium, the licensors are constrained
by the competition margin:
pi = zi = V (2)− V (nj).
Suppose the pool charges P > P , and that the users buy from the pool. Then, licensor i obtains
αiPD (P − V (2)). By charging (slightly below) pi = P − (V (2)− V (nj)), she could obtain
piD (P − V (2)). Because z1 + z2 < P , one cannot Þnd stakes α1 and α2 such that:
αiPD (P − V (2)) ≥ [P − (V (2)− V (nj))]D (P − V (2))
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for i = 1, 2. Hence the pool is strongly unstable. ¥
Proof of Proposition 8
(a) No pool.
If x and y denote the locations of a consumer in the natural differentiation space and the
technology space, and p1 and p2 denote the prices charged by the Þrms in the absence of pool,
then the consumer selects Þrm 1 if and only if
p1 + tx+ u y ≤ p2 + t (1− x) + u (1− y) .
The outcome is the Hotelling outcome (p∗, p∗) for marginal cost 0 and a differentiation whose
distribution is equal to the convolution of the two distributions.32 One has p∗ > t (unless u = 0,
in which case p∗ = t).
(b) Pool.
In case of a pool with royalty rate a, the opportunity cost of stealing a customer from ones
rival is equal to a (given that the dividend a/2 accrues to the Þrm regardless of who serves the
consumer). Each Þrm offers the patent 1- and patent 2-enabled versions and the unique price
equilibrium is a + t (see Hausman et al. 2003). [This assumes that a is not too large, so
that the two Þrms do compete for consumers. The analysis below extends when the royalty rate
is large as it relies on the prices increasing in a.] Each Þrm charges a fee to consumers equal
to the opportunity cost of acquiring the consumer plus the differentiation markup, and lets the
consumers select the version that best suits them by not charging different prices for different
versions.33
32The resulting distribution can be represented by a variable X ∈ £0, 1 + ut ¤ and a transportation parameter t.
The variable X has distribution given by L (X) ≡Pr¡x+ ut y < X¢ = Z 1
0
K
¡
X − ut y
¢
h (y) dy, where K and H
denote the cumulative distributions (here, the identity on [0, 1] ) of variables x and y.
33The result is obvious when the two patents are incorporated in the good (say, a software) manufactured by
the Þrms, which then do not offer multiple versions. The discussion above refers to the versioning case. Please
see Hausman et al (2003) for a discussion of the intuition behind this result.
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Letting v denote the gross surplus, a user spends the search cost s if and only if s ≤ s∗, where
s∗P (a+ t) = v− E(x,y)
½
min
{i,j}
{a+ t+ t | x− xi | +u | y − yj |}
¾
under a pool, and
s∗NP (p
∗) =v−E(x,y)
½
min
{i}
{p∗ + t | x− xi | +u | y − yi |}
¾
in the absence of a pool. The distribution of s in the population is given by the cumulative G(s),
and so total demand is G (s∗P ) under a pool and G (s
∗
NP ) in the absence of a pool. A pool creates
a better Þt and, keeping prices constant, increases demand. The per-Þrm proÞt is
πP (a) =
G (s∗P (a+ t))
2
(a+ t)
under a pool, and
πNP =
G (s∗NP (p
∗))
2
p∗
in the absence of a pool.
The monotone hazard rate condition together with the linearity of s∗P (·) imply that πP is
concave. Last, note that s∗P (p) > s
∗
NP (p) for all p (a pool allows for better quality offers). ¥
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